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THE PERSONHOOD PARADOX: CITIZENS UNITED AS
REJECTION OF CORPORATE PERSONHOOD? 
Stefan J. Padfield* 
I recently received reprints of my essay, Does Corporate Personhood 
Matter? A Review of, and Response to, Adam Winkler’s We the 
Corporations,1 and was reminded that Professor Tracy Thomas, 
Seiberling Chair of Constitutional Law and Director of the Center for 
Constitutional Law at the University of Akron School of Law, had 
generously offered to publish an excerpt thereof in ConLawNOW, the 
online legal journal published by the Center.2  The essay itself was an 
invited piece, my contribution to a CLE workshop, Business Law: 
Connecting the Threads II, at the University of Tennessee College of Law 
on September 14, 2018.3  What I have chosen to excerpt here, following 
a brief introduction, addresses three questions of corporate personhood 
that should be of interest to readers of this journal. 
* Stefan J. Padfield is a Professor of Law at The University of Akron School of Law. His areas of
expertise cover a wide variety of business law topics. Prior to joining the Akron Law faculty, 
Professor Padfield clerked for The Hon. John R. Gibson of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit, and The Hon. William E. Smith of the U.S. District Court in Providence, Rhode Island. 
Professor Padfield also worked as a corporate attorney for Cravath, Swaine & Moore, LLP, in New 
York City. You can follow Professor Padfield on Twitter via @ProfPadfield. He is also a regular 
contributor to the Business Law Prof Blog. 
1. 20 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 1009 (2019). 
2. See Center for Constitutional Law, U. OF AKRON SCH. OF L., 
https://www.uakron.edu/law/ccl/ [https://perma.cc/NP75-TQHQ] (“Congress established the Center 
for Constitutional Law at Akron in 1986 as one of four national resource centers dedicated to legal 
research on constitutional issues.”). 
3. See Joan Heminway, Connecting the Threads II - Laboring on Labor Day, BUSINESS LAW 
PROF BLOG (Sep. 3, 2018), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2018/09/connecting-the-
threads-ii-laboring-on-labor-day.html [https://perma.cc/EH3R-WREM] (“[O]ur second annual 
Business Law Prof Blog symposium . . . will be held at The University of Tennessee College of Law 
on September 14. The symposium again focuses on the work of many of your favorite Business Law 
Prof Blog editors, with commentary from my UT Law faculty colleagues and students.”). 
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INTRODUCTION4 
UCLA Law Professor Adam Winkler has published an excellent 
book on the history of corporate rights. The book, We the Corporations: 
How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights, “reveals the secret 
history of one of America’s most successful yet least-known ‘civil rights 
movements’—the centuries-long struggle for equal rights for 
corporations.”5 The book has been highly praised by some of the greatest 
minds in corporate and constitutional law, and the praise is well-deserved. 
However, the book is not without its controversial assertions, particularly 
when it comes to its characterizations of some of the key components of 
corporate personhood and corporate personality theory. This response 
essay will focus on unpacking some of these assertions, hopefully helping 
to ensure that advocates who rely on the book will be informed as to 
alternative approaches to key issues. 
Specifically, the propositions examined in this Essay include: (1) 
“corporate personhood has played only a small role in the expansion of 
constitutional rights to corporations,”6 (2) “the history of corporate rights 
has largely been a struggle between the disparate poles of personhood and 
piercing,”7 and (3) “in Dartmouth College. . . . Marshall was saying that 
corporations were too ethereal to be the basis for constitutional rights and 
that, instead, the court should focus on the corporation’s members.”8 
While I provide reasons for questioning each of the foregoing 
propositions, I ultimately conclude that none of these criticisms 
undermine the book’s overall value. Most, if not all, of the issues I identify 
may be viewed as providing alternative ways of thinking about what is 
essentially the same perspective. However, advocates relying on 
Winkler’s book who have not been alerted to these criticisms risk being 
caught off guard in ways that will undermine their objectives. Thus, this 
Essay will hopefully provide a useful adjunct to Winkler’s impressive 
work. 
4. Excerpted from Padfield, supra note 1, at 1009. 
5. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR
CIVIL RIGHTS, at back cover (2018). 
6. Id. at 37. 
7. Id. at 61-62. 
8. Id. at 66 (discussing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)). 
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I. PIERCING OR IGNORING THE CORPORATE PERSON VERSUS APPLYING 
AGGREGATE OR REAL ENTITY THEORY9 
By way of introduction, concession theory (also known as artificial 
entity theory) views the corporation as a creature of the state that is 
presumed to be subject to much greater regulation than citizens. 
Aggregate theory (often aligned with the nexus-of-contracts theory of the 
corporation)10 views the corporation as merely an association of 
individuals (typically, the shareholders) who, like many other 
associations, can assert a variety of rights against government regulation, 
even when acting in the corporate form.11 Finally, real entity theory is 
quite similar to aggregate theory, except that it views the relevant 
association as either broader than or different from an association of 
shareholders in order to, among other things, avoid jeopardizing the 
shareholders’ limited liability.12 
In We the Corporations, Winkler barely mentions the traditional 
theories of the corporation.13 Rather, he presents the relevant issue as one 
of piercing versus personhood or, alternatively, ignoring versus respecting 
corporate personhood. For example, he argues that “the history of 
corporate rights has largely been a struggle between the disparate poles of 
personhood and piercing.”14 Elsewhere, he states that when the Supreme 
Court has “ignored the corporate form and looked to the rights of the 
individuals who made up the corporation, the rulings naturally tended to 
give corporations nearly all the same rights as individuals.”15 
9. Excerpted from Padfield, supra note 1, at 1015-16, 1026-29.
10. Cf. Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate Regulation, 11 TENN. J. 
BUS. L. 135, 138 (2009) (“The most problematic portion of the nexus-of-contracts framework for me 
has been the normative claim that many proponents of the framework have proffered: that, because 
the corporation can be viewed as this bundle of privately ordered contracts, regulation is largely 
unnecessary and undesirable.”). 
11. Cf. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of
“Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2011) (“Corporations are not creatures 
of contract. One cannot contract to form a corporation. The individuals involved must apply to a state 
for permission to create such an entity. The fact that this permission is readily granted . . . does not 
change the fact that permission is required.”). 
12. Cf. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 586 (1839) (“If it were held . . . that the
members of a corporation were to be regarded as individuals carrying on business in their corporate 
name . . . they . . . would be . . . a mere partnership in business, in which each stockholder would be 
liable to the whole extent of his property for the debts of the corporation . . . .”). 
13. For example, a search of the Kindle version of the book revealed that the word
“concession” does not appear once. 
14. WINKLER, CORPORATIONS, supra, note 5, at 62. 
15. Id. at 62 (concluding that “[e]xpansive constitutional rights for corporations were built into 
the logic of piercing.”). 
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Thus, we are left with two competing characterizations. On the one 
hand, we might characterize the relevant cases as acknowledging 
corporate personhood while applying the aggregate or real entity view 
to focus on the natural persons making up the corporation. On the other 
hand, we can characterize the analysis as ignoring corporate personhood, 
and piercing the corporate veil to get at those same natural persons. 
However, at least one of the problems with stating the case as one of 
ignoring corporate personhood is that this flies in the face of corporate 
personhood being what gets the corporation through the courthouse doors 
in the first place. I will address this point in more detail below. 
Relatedly, the problem with using the narrative of piercing is that 
piercing is generally understood to be a means of imposing liability on 
shareholders, not expanding the scope of their rights against regulation to 
encompass their actions via the corporate form.16 Winkler acknowledges 
this last point when he writes that: 
The ordinary rule, ever since the days of Blackstone, is that there is a 
strict separation between the corporation and the people behind it. That 
is why the corporation, not the stockholders, is liable if someone is 
injured using the company’s products. In a small number of highly 
unusual cases, however, the courts will pierce the corporate veil, 
ignoring the separate legal status of the corporation and imposing 
liability on the stockholders personally. Piercing the corporate veil in 
business law cases is very rare, and courts typically only do it when 
someone uses the corporate form to perpetuate a fraud or commit 
wrongdoing.17 
16. Reverse piercing may be used to allow a plaintiff to access the assets of a corporation
owned by a defendant who has been found liable to the plaintiff. Ariella M. Lvov, Preserving Limited 
Liability: Mitigating the Inequities of Reverse Veil Piercing with A Comprehensive Framework, 18 
U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 161 (2018) (describing reverse piercing as “facilitating access to a corporation’s 
assets for satisfaction of a wrongdoing-shareholder’ personal debt”). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Using Reverse Veil Piercing to Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16 
GREEN BAG 2d 235, 242 (2013) (“At least one court has recognized the potential for using [reverse 
veil piercing] in the mandate cases, opining that these cases ‘pose difficult questions of first 
impression,’ including whether it is ‘possible to “pierce the veil” and disregard the corporate form in 
this context,’ which merit ‘more deliberate investigation.”‘) (citation omitted); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & 
Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with 
Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 902 (2016) (“[A]lthough the [Deveaux] Court 
held that a corporation could be considered as a ‘company of individuals’ for jurisdictional purposes, 
it did not suggest that it would pierce the corporate veil and look through to the individuals comprising 
the corporation for any purposes that were not incidental to the corporation’s existence—such as 
spending money on a political campaign.”). 
17. WINKLER, CORPORATIONS, supra, note 5, at 55. 
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Perhaps these competing perspectives can be explained as flowing 
from differences between corporate and constitutional law. As Winkler 
describes it: “[P]iercing the veil in business law cases is limited to rare 
cases involving fraud or abuse; it is the exception, not the rule. In 
constitutional law, by contrast, the exception would become the 
rule.”18 Or perhaps they constitute a distinction without a difference.19 At 
the very least, it is likely important for advocates to understand that they 
may get very different reactions depending on whether they (1) describe 
the justification for granting corporations rights as being rooted in 
piercing the corporate veil or ignoring corporate personhood, as opposed 
to (2) acknowledging a need and respect for corporate personhood, but 
focusing on the aggregate and/or real entity theory of corporate 
personhood to justify the extension of rights. 
A word here about Masterpiece Cakeshop,20 the recent U.S. 
Supreme Court case wherein a baker, operating in the corporate form, had 
been found by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (CCRC) to have 
violated the Colorado Anti—Discrimination Act by refusing to bake a 
wedding cake for a same-sex couple due to his religious objection to 
same-sex marriage. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the 
baker by a vote of 7-2, finding that that the CCRC had failed to comply 
with the U.S. Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause’s requirement of 
religious neutrality by displaying a hostility to religion in its 
proceedings.21 What is of particular relevance here is that the Court 
completely ignored the argument that the plaintiff in the case was a 
corporation rather than the individual baker, and that at the very least the 
right of a corporation to claim religious freedom under the U.S. 
Constitution had not yet been decided, and that such a right should not be 
granted to corporations.22 
Leading up to the case, I signed on to the Brief of Amici Curiae 
Corporate Law Professors, authored by Kent Greenfield23 and Daniel 
18. Id. at 67-68. 
19. Cf. id. at 378 (“Romney and the justices used the language of personhood but employed
the logic of piercing. They called corporations ‘people,’ yet pierced the corporate veil, looking right 
through the corporate form to base the decision on the rights of the corporations’ members.”). 
20. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
21. Id. at 1729 (“The Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of [the baker’s] case has some
elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his 
objection.”). 
22. Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that corporations 
had standing under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which is understood to grant broader 
protection for religious exercise than the First Amendment). 
23. Professor and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School.
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Rubens,24 which argued in part that “because of the separate legal 
personality of corporations and shareholders, the constitutional interests 
of shareholders should not be projected onto the corporation.”25 Thus, the 
Court certainly should have been aware of the issue. However, the Court 
at least assumed for the purposes of the opinion both that the corporation 
had standing, and that nothing about its corporate status should 
differentiate the relevant analysis from what it would have been had the 
plaintiff been a natural person. 
Following issuance of the opinion, Winkler wrote a column in Slate 
with the headline: Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Surprising Breadth: The 
Supreme Court granted constitutional religious liberty to corporations—
without explaining why.26 Winkler did note the possibility that “future 
courts, when confronted with corporate assertions of religious liberty, will 
say that Masterpiece Cakeshop leaves the issue open and sets no 
definitive precedent,” but further noted that history “suggests another 
outcome” because corporations have repeatedly “won rights through 
Supreme Court decisions that, like Masterpiece Cakeshop, provide little 
or no justification for why corporations as such should be able to claim 
those rights.”27 
To return to the theme of this section, it is likely too early to tell 
whether Masterpiece Cakeshop will strengthen Winkler’s claim that 
corporate rights expand when courts ignore corporate personhood, or 
whether the issue will be deemed to have been left open, and future 
resolution will involve at least some discussion of whether corporations 
are better conceived of as (1) mere associations of individuals, thereby 
embracing aggregate or real entity theory, or (2) state creations subject to 
greater government control than natural persons, thereby embracing 
concession/artificial entity theory.28 
24. Senior Associate, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP.
25. Brief for Corporate Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S.Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 
WL 5127303. 
26. Adam Winkler, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Surprising Breadth, SLATE (June 6, 2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/masterpiece-cakeshop-grants-constitutional-religious-
liberty-rights-to-corporations.html [https://perma.cc/R6RB-CQ8U]. 
27. Id.
28. Cf. Howard Kislowicz, Business Corporations as Religious Freedom Claimants in
Canada, 51 REVUE JURIDIQUE THÉMIS DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL 337, 337-38 (2017) (“The 
argument for categorically denying a corporation’s religious freedom claims usually rests on a 
conception of what the corporation is: as an artificial person, a corporation simply cannot hold the 
requisite religious or conscientious belief to ground such a claim.”). 
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II. DEBATING DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
The U.S. Supreme Court case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward29 is routinely cited as representative of concession theory.30 G. 
Richard Shell provides a general description of the case: 
In Dartmouth College the Court held that the state of New Hampshire 
violated the contract clause of the U.S. Constitution by attempting to 
revoke a royal charter granted to Dartmouth College before the 
American Revolution. Justice Story opined that the Constitution would 
not be offended by changes in state corporation law if the state 
conditioned the granting of its charters with a reserved power to alter or 
amend the corporate statute. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 
675, 712 (Story, J., concurring). This lawyerly advice led to enactment 
of ‘reserve power’ clauses in all state corporation statutes under which 
states reserved the right to alter, amend, or repeal provisions of their 
corporate codes without constitutional limitation.31
The characterization of Dartmouth College as representative of 
concession theory stems primarily from the following and related 
language in the opinion: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing 
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it 
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers 
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence False The 
objects for which a corporation is created are universally such as the 
government wishes to promote.32
However, in We the Corporations, Prof. Winkler describes this 
characterization as a mistake.33 Instead, Winkler posits that the opinion 
29. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
30. J.W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 at 9 (“borrowing from Coke and Blackstone, Marshall gave this view 
classic expression” in Dartmouth College); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 at 72 n.36 (1992) (citing Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636, in 
connection with discussion of concession theory of the corporation); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens 
United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1006 (2010) (“This language reflects the 
artificial entity view of the corporation.”) (quoting Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636). 
31. G. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REV. 517, 544 n.175 
(1989). 
32. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636-37. 
33. See WINKLER, CORPORATIONS, supra note 5, at 66 (“Although some have mistakenly
interpreted that language in Dartmouth College to mean that Marshall embraced corporate 
personhood, in fact he meant the opposite. Marshall was saying that corporations were too ethereal to 
be the basis for constitutional rights and that, instead, the court should focus on the corporation’s 
members.”). 
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and quoted language represents more piercing of the corporate veil and 
ignoring of corporate personhood in order to expand corporate rights: 
[W]hen Marshall echoed his line from Bank of the United States and 
described the corporation in Dartmouth College as “an artificial being, 
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law,” he was 
offering a justification for once again rejecting corporate personhood. 
The artificiality and invisibility of the corporation made it appropriate 
to look right through the corporation to focus instead on the members.34 
While it is true that Dartmouth College could have treated the corporation 
as subject to even greater state control than it did, the oft-quoted 
language—particularly that being “the mere creature of law,” a 
corporation “possesses only those properties which the charter of its 
creation confers upon it,” and that the “objects for which a corporation is 
created are universally such as the government wishes to promote”—is 
simply not congruent with the view that corporations are merely 
associations of individuals. Rather, the language quite clearly expresses 
the view that corporations are materially different from natural persons, 
and that this difference is rooted in the state’s role in their creation and 
scope of rights. 
Having said that, the opinion just as clearly does not ignore the 
natural persons carrying out the various roles that make corporations 
manifest, and it places meaningful constitutional limits on the state’s 
power to amend the bargain it has entered into with those people, absent 
adequate notice.35 So how should an advocate use the opinion? 
My advice to advocates intending to make use of the opinion, or 
likely to encounter it, is to recognize that the artificial entity/concession 
theory language is just too strong, and the history of the opinion being 
cited as standing for those theories too long, to think it effective to start 
citing and discussing it as representative of aggregate theory or 
piercing.36 However, depending on the advocate’s goals, noting the 
34. Id. at 86-87. 
35. Cf. Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 69 (1992) (“Advocates of Contract Clause protection for shareholders are 
aware of the ‘reserve’ clauses resulting from Dartmouth College, but they appear to underestimate 
the full import of these powers. States have ‘reserved’ the freedom . . . to ‘impair’ the rights of 
shareholders . . . .”). 
36. On August 24, 2018, I ran a Westlaw search for “‘Dartmouth College’/ s (‘concession 
theory’ ‘artificial entity’).” The search returned 18 secondary source citations, and a quick review of 
the five most cited showed that four of the five positively associate Dartmouth College with 
concession theory in at least some manner. See Orts, supra note 35, at 68 (“[T]he new Contract Clause 
challenge asks courts to accept the recently minted and influential ‘contracts theory’ of the 
corporation. This theory derides the ‘concession theory’ of the corporation attributable to Dartmouth 
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emphasis of the opinion on the contractual nature of the corporation, as 
well as the fact that the opinion limited government intrusion into the 
workings of the corporation by at least in part highlighting its private 
rather than public status, are important qualifications to at least be aware 
of. 
III. DOES CORPORATE PERSONHOOD MATTER?
In We the Corporations, Winkler writes that “[t]oday’s critics 
of Citizens United often blame corporate personhood for the Supreme 
Court’s expansive protection of corporate rights. Yet historically, the 
logic of personhood has usually been employed by populists seeking to 
narrow or limit the rights of corporations.”37 Elsewhere, he argues that 
“for those today who wish to see the Supreme Court restrict the 
constitutional rights of corporations, looking back to Webster’s era 
reveals a potential model. By embracing corporate personhood, rather 
than piercing the corporate veil, the Taney court imposed boundaries on 
the rights of corporations.”38 Putting aside questions about Webster’s 
era,39 piercing the corporate veil,40 and the role of Taney in the corporate 
College . . . .”); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 
BROOK. L. REV. 767, 774 (1989) (“[T]he ‘concession’ theory . . . view of the corporation was stated 
in the first great corporation case of this country, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.”); 
Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1635 (2011) 
(“Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, illustrates how the concession theory animated the 
Supreme Court’s early view of the corporation.”); Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining the 
Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors’ Duties to 
Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 101 (1995) (“As recently as 1987, the Supreme Court has quoted 
with approval the concession theory articulated in Dartmouth.”) (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. 
of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987)). But see Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract Nor Concession: 
The Public Personality of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 209 (2006) (“The stark and 
simple alternatives of contract and concession have transfixed and distracted us, ultimately preventing 
us from seeing that Dartmouth College treated the corporation not as a creature of the state, but as an 
“immortal being” and formidable personality whose life was to be governed not on the basis of 
contract, but on principles of trust.”). Cf. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 
428 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (“‘[T]he notion that business corporations could invoke 
the First Amendment would probably have been quite a novelty,’ given that ‘at the [founding], the 
legitimacy of every corporate activity was thought to rest entirely in a concession of the sovereign.”‘) 
(quoting David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541, 
578 (1991), and citing Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636). 
37. WINKLER, CORPORATION, supra note 5, at 62. 
38. Id. at 75. 
39. Cf. O’Melinn, supra note 36, at 231 (“Daniel Webster, who represented the trustees in
Dartmouth College, thought that the notable feature of his era was that ‘public improvements are 
brought about by a voluntary association and combination.”‘) (quoting Arthur M. Schlesinger, 
Biography of a Nation of Joiners, 50 AM. HIST. REV. 1, 9 n.16 (1944)). 
40. See supra notes 13-25. 
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civil rights movement,41 these quotes, along with others in the book, could 
be read to suggest that Winkler views progressive attempts to rein in 
corporate power by seeking to end corporate personhood as counter-
productive. In fact, rather than seeking to end corporate personhood, 
Winkler argues these advocates should seek to strengthen it. 
There’s a lot to unpack here, but the point I want to focus on is that 
there is a distinction between corporate personhood as a basis for legal 
standing, and corporate personhood as a justification for the scope of 
rights granted once standing is granted.42 Hobby Lobby provides a good 
example of the distinction. While Winkler acknowledges that a major 
issue in the case was whether corporations are persons under the relevant 
statute (in this case the Religious Freedom Restoration Act), he ultimately 
concludes that “[p]roperly understood, Alito’s decision, like Citizens 
United, represented a rejection of corporate personhood.”43 How are we 
to understand this apparent contradiction? 
Perhaps a better way of understanding Hobby Lobby is to view 
corporate personhood as being essential to granting religious exercise 
rights to corporations because, after all, had a majority of the court 
concluded, as the dissent argued, that corporations are unable to exercise 
religion and thus should not be deemed persons under the statute, then the 
case would have ended there, and the corporations would not have been 
allowed to claim exemption from generally applicable laws by way of an 
accommodation of their religious exercise rights. On the other hand, once 
corporations are deemed persons under the statute, we are still left with 
the question of what type of person they should be treated as. There are a 
number of Supreme Court cases that differentiate the extent to which 
certain types of natural persons can claim certain rights, balancing the 
needs of the person against the needs of society and the state in a particular 
41. See WINKLER, CORPORATION, supra note 5, at xix (“Chief Justice Roger Taney, the author 
of the infamous Dred Scott case, whose reactionary views on race have left him one of the most 
reviled figures in the history of the Supreme Court, was one of the most forceful advocates for limiting 
the constitutional rights of corporations.”). 
42. Cf. Stephen Bainbridge, Sonia Sotomayor and the Corporate Personhood, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Sep. 17, 2009) (“Government regulation of corporations obviously 
impacts the people for whose relationships the corporate serves as a nexus. . . . It’s useful to allow the 
corporation to provide those persons with a single voice when seeking constitutional protections. 
Indeed, doing so is not just useful, it is necessary to protect the rights of the parties to those various 
contracts.”), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/09/sonia-
sotomayor-and-the-corporate-personhood.html [https://perma.cc/EC65-5ESB]. 
43. WINKLER, CORPORATION, supra note 5, at 381 (“[A]s with many previous Supreme Court 
cases invoking corporate personhood, the underlying logic of Hobby Lobby reflected instead piercing 
the corporate veil.”). 
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context.44 So, when Winkler says Alito rejected corporate personhood, he 
may be better understood to be saying that Alito rejected any conception 
of corporate personhood that would differentiate the rights of the 
corporations from those of the average citizen. In other words, Alito 
adopted the aggregate or perhaps real entity view of the corporation, and 
rejected the artificial entity/concession theory. 
Thus, progressive advocates for limiting corporate power arguably 
are justified in both (1) seeking to end corporate personhood, and (2) 
seeking to advance a theory of corporate personhood that highlights the 
distinction between the corporate entity and, for example, the 
shareholders of that corporation. Furthermore, when Winkler argues that 
“for those today who wish to see the Supreme Court restrict the 
constitutional rights of corporations, looking back to Webster’s era 
reveals a potential model,” he may best be understood as referring to the 
model of concession theory.45 
44. Cf. Catherine A. Hardee, Who’s Causing the Harm?, 106 KY. L.J. 751, 754 (2018) (“Under 
Hobby Lobby, the answer to who is causing the harm is neither a corporation nor an individual, but 
rather an individual granted the powers and privileges afforded corporations under state law.”). 
45. WINKLER, CORPORATION, supra note 5, at 75 (“Moreover, for those today who wish to see 
the Supreme Court restrict the constitutional rights of corporations, looking back to Webster’s era 
reveals a potential model. By embracing corporate personhood, rather than piercing the corporate veil, 
the Taney court imposed boundaries on the rights of corporations.”). Comparing this quote to the 
following authored by Justice Taney in the case of Ohio Life Ins. & Tr. Co. v. Debolt, arguably 
provides at least some basis for describing the relevant model as concession theory. 
The grant of privileges and exemptions to a corporation are strictly construed against the 
corporation, and in favor of the public. Nothing passes but what is granted in clear and 
explicit terms. And neither the right of taxation nor any other power of sovereignty which 
the community have an interest in preserving, undiminished, will be held by the court to 
be surrendered, unless the intention to surrender is manifested by words too plain to be 
mistaken. 
57 U.S. 416, 435 (1853). 
